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Despite the surge of scholarly interest in terrorism and counter-terrorism in the post-
9/11 world, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of religious actors
(especially faith communities and faith leaders) in combating the threat of terrorism.
However, the resurgence of religiosity in contemporary politics should not be viewed as
an inherently dangerous force. As Appleby has argued, a new secular-religious model
of inter and intra-state diplomacy looms as a development with significant potential to
resolve conflict and deny terrorist groups access to communities of support. By drawing
on an Australian example, we argue that in societies that have a strong multicultural
and multifaith character secular-religious diplomacy pitched at the national and sub-
national level can play an important role in the formation of a flexible long-term
counterterrorism strategy.
Excluding Religiosity from Counterterrorism Praxis
Amid the surge of scholarly interest in terrorism and counterterrorism in the post-9/11
world surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of religious communities or
community leaders in combating terrorism.1 For instance, in the recent call by Katona et al.
for a global counterterrorist network, including experts from medical, health, economic,
policy, law enforcement, military, and intelligence sectors, notably religious communities,
theologians, and sociologists of religion were excluded.2 Given that Katona et al. also stated,
“[t]errorism has been evolving as a political, religious and criminal tactic for thousands of
years” this seems a somewhat gross omission.3 However, it was not a mere oversight but is
rather a reflection of the resilience of the post-Westphalian focus on separating religion and
state, a practice that has led to the general exclusion of religion from most modern security
discourses.4
There is a significant irony to this reluctance to pay greater attention to religion and
religiosity in the crafting of counterterrorism praxis. The irony rests in the reality that like
it or not, religion has forced its way into local and global security agendas through the
role it plays as a key organizing principle for an emerging generation of disenfranchised
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922 A. Halafoff and D. Wright-Neville
individuals who are linked through a combination of shared parochial and international
concerns. Indeed, it is our contention that the failure to pay closer attention to the positive
roles that religion and religious figures can play in counterterrorism practices is a significant
reason for why, in the words of Katona et al., “we are no safer now than before 9/11” and
that there has been “little done to break the backs of the various terrorist organizations.”5 In
short, the expenditure of many billions of dollars, the progressive hardening of state powers
of surveillance and arrest, and the extensive use of conventional and unconventional military
power against actual and assumed terrorist targets around the world, has yielded few results
that are likely to generate long-term benefits in terms of public safety and community
cohesion.
There are many reasons for the resilience of contemporary terrorist groups and the
failure of counterterrorism policies to stem their activities, among the most important of
which is reluctance by policymakers to acknowledge the “root causes” of the anger that
inspires the violence.6 However, similarly important is the terrorists’ use of networks, or
more accurately “networks of networks,” which have the capacity to confound traditional
state-based security responses.7 Recognizing the centrality of both formal and informal
networks of the angry and disenfranchised in sustaining contemporary terrorist movements,
many writers have observed (correctly in the present authors’ view) that dealing with the
threat requires the development of more extensive and proactive counterterrorism networks.
For example, Katona et al. observe that, “partnerships are now needed that were previously
uncalled for or unnecessary and, in many cases, never even considered. . . . Success in
countering global insurgency requires not only top-down national security intelligence,
but bottom-up local and peer-to-peer intelligence and coordination.”8 Yet once again, the
definition of networks adopted by Katona and his co-authors is limited to state-based actors.
Moreover, even when they speak of “bottom-up local” coordination they are referring only
to those institutions whose authority rests overwhelmingly on covert activities and/or the
use of hard power; namely police and intelligence agencies. They make no mention of the
valuable contribution that networks forged from civil society groups, such as inter-faith
initiatives, can play as adjunct networks capable of working in parallel with state-based
agencies and that, if effective, can attenuate the social costs that are sometimes imposed
through the injudicious use of hard power.
Juergensmeyer’s chapter, included in the volume by Katona et al.,9 picks up on this
point when he argues that any effective response to religiously motivated terrorism must
recognize that for the terrorists the violence is justified in terms of a “cosmic war,” wherein
the world is bifurcated into forces of absolute good and absolute evil and where “the
absolutism of cosmic war makes compromise unlikely, and those who suggest a negotiated
settlement are as excoriated as the enemy.”10 Once the world is looked at through such
a lens, standard political and military responses are almost always rendered inadequate
as either deterrents or modes of punishment. Because the state and its agents are already
perceived as agents of evil, the application of hard power is seen simply as conformation
of their malevolence. At the same time, the potential for hard power to inflict damage on
innocent bystanders, either through the erosion of basic human rights or through cases of
mistaken identity of simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time, can also work to
the advantage of the terrorists by providing them with examples of the wicked and hostile
intensions of the state.11
A large part of the problem therefore stems from the crafting of counterterrorism prob-
lems that ignore the resurgence of interest for what Juergensmeyer (among many others)
has called a “desire for a renewed role for religion in public life.”12 Against this background
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A Missing Peace? 923
there is a tendency among many in society to see the overtly secular and heavy-handed na-
ture of counterterrorism as an assault on them and their religiosity. Juergensmeyer’s insights
are not new. Since Johnston and Sampson’s Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft
was published in 1994,13 there have been numerous studies of the efficacy of religious
leaders in post-conflict resolution and peace-building14; however, surprisingly little of this
scholarship has translated into counterterrorism theory or practice. The imbalance between
effective “soft” and ineffective “hard” power practices remains wide and there is a pressing
need to bridge this divide by incorporating insights gained from religious, interreligious,
and secular–religious peace-building research and praxis.
Post-Secular Security
Western modernity’s skepticism toward religion is widely understood as having its
roots in the Reformation but reaching fuller intellectual maturity during and after the
Enlightenment.15 Within the file of international politics and security, the principles of
the Enlightenment were embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which recognized
previously warring states as equal and therefore invoked the concept of sovereignty, which
as Mu¨nkler points out “became the basis for Europe’s international laws of war, according
to which only sovereign states had the right to wage war,” a situation that forced even
the Pope and the Emperor to situate themselves on a level footing with other sovereign
powers.16 According to Thomas the so-called Westphalian presumption in international
relations, derived from fears arising from the European religious wars, was that ultimately
religion threatened security and therefore religion “must be disciplined by the state” and
“overcome by a global or cosmopolitan ethic.”17
While recognizing the existence of multiple modernities and that religion and state have
never truly been separate in Western societies, a detailed discussion of the actual variety of
state–religion relationships in and beyond Australia is outside the scope of this chapter.18
However, in the case of security discourses one can safely say that realpolitik, the hardnosed
human instinct that the realist approach to politics and international relations assumes, has
historically excluded religion based, at least in part, on lingering Westphalian fears.19
Yet since the 1980s the global rise of religious “fundamentalist” movements and studies
examining religion’s role in globalization, civil society, conflict, and peace-building have
challenged this exclusion.20 In addition, the spread of ethnic, religious, and communally
based conflicts in the post–Cold War period has in some people’s opinion presaged the
need for a new form of faith-based diplomacy whereby traditional diplomatic practices are
infused with a greater recognition of the importance of religion and faith in the modern
world.21 Although this article is not arguing that such an approach is a panacea for the
world’s ills, the success of such initiatives in the few instances where they have been trialed
provides significant scope for optimism in the post-9/11 environment. The events of 9/11
provided an especially dramatic example of the diminished utility of conventional Realism
as a heuristic device for understanding international politics. As Robert Keohane observed,
“the attacks of September 11 reveal that all mainstream theories of world politics are
relentlessly secular with respect to motivation. They ignore the impact of religion, despite
the fact that world-shaking political movements have so often been fueled by religious
fervor.”22 It is for this reason that writers such as Keohane and Johnston23 have called for
a new realist perspective, one that acknowledges both the negative and positive influences
of religion in an increasingly interdependent global society.
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924 A. Halafoff and D. Wright-Neville
For Johnston, the failure to make this perceptual adjustment imposes significant con-
straints on policymakers and security experts.24 Because they remain trapped within analyt-
ical paradigms that are traditionally hostile or ambivalent to the role of culture and religion
in shaping human agency, or because the innate sensitivity of the issue militates against
comfortable public comment and action, counterterrorism practitioners are disadvantaged
by the constraints they have been placed under to ensure the separation of religion and
state. Indeed, as will be argued shortly, a better understanding of the role of religion (and
other identity-based markers) in shaping political agency in the contemporary world carries
the promise of substantial analytical and practical returns. In particular, there is a need to
re-examine and adjust conventional assumptions about the role of religion as a phenomenon
that is neatly compartmentalized within the private realm. The use of religion as an orga-
nizing principle for political action is not inconsistent with rational behavior, despite what
is commonly believed. As Hoover notes, “national security and foreign policy practitioners
must begin to treat religion as a serious variable in the conduct of international relations.”25
At the same time there is a parallel need to recognize the potential that religious leaders
and authorities can play in the contemporary world in helping to avoid or reduce the risk
of conflict, particularly that which involves terrorism.26
Yet, despite the growing recognition of the need to pay closer attention to the role of
religion in the mediation and settling of conflict, or in Johnston and Sampson’s words, to
“bring faith-based voices” into the international relations conversation, few scholars have
been prepared to challenge secular orthodoxies while others have struggled to find a way
to put into action what remains a largely theoretical construct. This is despite the growing
weight of empirical evidence underscoring the urgency of such an agenda. The world is
becoming more violent as the Westphalian notion of the state as the only body with the
sovereign right to use force erodes in the face of new patterns of transnational identity and
new types of grievances that are simultaneously local and global.27
But is the future as bleak as some writers suggest? Appleby describes the emergence
of a new secular–religious model of diplomacy as a promising recent development and
attributes “the building of strong secular and religious networks and coalitions” as the key
to its continued success.28 Religious actors are well networked within their own local and
global religious communities and are increasingly well positioned to offer cultural and
religious insights to secular officials that are vital for the establishment of new discourses
and dialogues. The efficacy of religious–secular peace-building and conflict transformation
depends on the fostering of fluid and malleable partnerships between secular agencies
(including nongovernmental organizations) and government agencies that create operational
synergies that ensure “technical expertise, media connections, financial means, intelligence
data, logistical capabilities, and other resources” flow more freely between and within
different segments of the community and between these community groups and different
segments of the state.29
An example of how this model works is the manner in which authorities in Victoria
have responded to global crisis events, such as 9/11, and the London and Bali bombings.
Following these events, the state government worked closely with Victoria Police to develop
an inclusive approach to counterterrorism management. Aware of the dangers posed to
social harmony in a highly multicultural city such as Melbourne should the terrorist attacks
provoke anti-Muslim vigilantism, a number of initiatives were put in place designed to
calm the community, militate against the spread of crude cultural stereotypes, and include
religious leaders from across the spectrum of faiths in initiatives designed to buttress
community resilience. These initiatives have proven to be highly successful, particularly as
preventative strategies promoting social inclusion and post-conflict reconstruction.30
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A Missing Peace? 925
Inclusive Counterterrorism Networks in Victoria
Even though religion and religious leaders have played a significant role in the construction
of social capital in Australia through contribution to: the formation of values, education,
health care, welfare, aid, philanthropy, social justice, multiculturalism, and family cohesion,
research indicates that Australia’s social capital could be destroyed by: exclusion promoted
by religion, religious extremism and intolerance, gender inequity, and anti-Islamic views.31
More ominously, several recent Australian studies have documented a rise of discrimination
toward Arab and Muslim Australians following the events of 9/11.32 These have been
matched by the phenomenon of misplaced Islamophobia whereby “non-Muslim Arab,
Lebanese, Indian, Sikh, Pacific Islander, and African communities” are targeted for attack.
Increases in migrantophobia, xenophobia, racism, and religious vilification have also been
reported.33
Recent events in Australia provide a pertinent illustration that despite the rise in
discourses of exclusivist and discriminatory sentiments in the post-9/11 period, particularly
evident in the Australian context in the “Values Debate” fostered by the Howard government
and the 2005 riots at Sydney’s Cronulla beach, religious communities have been far from
passive. In particular, they have actively sought to resist disempowerment by initiating
dialogues and a variety of community and educational activities designed to dispel negative
stereotypes and attitudes. A multiplicity of initiatives aimed at building secular–religious
networks between the state and its key agencies (such as the police) and on the other hand
religious and ethnic communities have been launched in an attempt to rebut the claim
made by the former Treasurer in the Howard government, Peter Costello (and echoed
by many of his fellow conservatives) that “mushy, misguided multiculturalism” is in fact
“part of the problem.”34 Against this knee-jerk hostility to cultural diversity and a priori
assumption of its inherently dangerous character, culturally, religiously, and linguistically
diverse (CRALD) Victorian communities have reported the success of a wide range of
initiatives in advancing social inclusion and genuine security. Alternately, rising narrow
nationalism and assimilationist strategies promoted by the former Howard government have
been reported as exacerbating feelings of exclusion and thereby security risks.35
Despite national and international debates and critiques of multiculturalism, the “re-
silience of multiculturalism” reported by CRALD communities in Victoria is worthy of
mention.36 A significant rise in educational activities promoting awareness and under-
standing of Muslim culture and of multi-faith engagement has been reported in Victoria
following 9/11.37 Community-led initiatives, such as mosque open days, inter-faith educa-
tional programs and symposia, and multi-faith festivals have at times been funded by state
and federal governments. Muslim communities have been active in addressing the negative
effects of divisive and ill-informed media reporting through positive media engagement.38
Muslim public intellectuals have countered negative stereotypes and promoted understand-
ing of their communities through commercial and independent media.39 The success of
Salam Cafe´, a Muslim current affairs and comedy program, which appeared initially on
independent TV Channel 31 and has been picked up by SBS, the mainstream Australian
multicultural TV channel, further indicates the pro-active responses of young Muslims in
promoting understanding of Muslim culture and religion.40
State governments and local councils in Victoria have also initiated a plethora of
multi-faith activities in partnership with local communities. Notable examples include:
The Victorian Government’s Community Accord, Celebrate our Cultural Diversity Week,
Multifaith Leaders Forum, and the Multifaith, Multicultural Youth Forum.41 These initiatives
aim to foster an inclusive Victorian community where religious diversity is welcome,
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926 A. Halafoff and D. Wright-Neville
religious traditions and practices are respected as long as they are consistent with the law
and human rights, good relations between diverse communities and state actors assist new
communities with settlement and in managing old and new tensions should they occur. In
this way these initiatives contribute to building genuinely secure communities and form a
significant part of preventative counterterrorism strategies.
The Victorian government and former Premier of Victoria Steve Bracks in particular
have been praised for their commitment to multiculturalism as a strategy for promoting
security through social inclusion.42 This is hardly surprising considering that the State Gov-
ernment of Victoria’s counterterrorism policy declares that a long-term view to attacking the
causes of terrorism includes “re-affirming Australia’s commitment to multiculturalism.”43
The former Premier of Victoria also stated,
Governments must take a long-term view to address the causes of terrorism.
The Victorian community gains great strength from its long history of democ-
racy, diversity and harmony. The Government believes that an effective ap-
proach to terrorism must include measures to prevent, at its roots, the rise of
radicalism that advocates terrorism. This can only be achieved through coop-
eration and partnership with faith and community leaders together with their
communities.44
In addition to expressing support for the Victorian Government, CRALD Victorians have
expressed an overwhelmingly positive view of Victoria police and community policing, no-
tably for their high level of community engagement and willingness to work in partnership
with communities to address critical issues45 while simultaneous research has demon-
strated that community policing operates as a highly effective counterterrorism strategy in
Victoria.46 It is important not to lose sight of this point. A defining feature of terrorism
throughout history has been the ability of key organizers and recruiters to prey on feelings of
marginalization and alienation to either attract new recruits or, more subtly, solicit financial
and other forms of logistic support from sympathetic communities.47 In the contemporary
world, this has changed only to the extent that grievances and feelings of alienation are
being disembedded from their parochial roots and reconfigured within a global milieu.48
In other words, the key drivers of terrorism are becoming internationalized, a reality that is
most dramatically revealed in the transnational character of groups such as Al Qaeda and
the mix of domestic and international issues that inspired the four men responsible for the
attacks on London’s public transport system on 7 July 2005.
Terrorist recruiters have developed a range of sophisticated techniques designed to
exploit low levels of social capital and correspondingly low levels of self-esteem and
feelings of powerlessness—especially among young males—as a way of attracting fresh
waves of volunteers for their cause.49 As part of this strategy they have been especially
adept at manipulating the negative experiences of individuals who have experienced the
strengthened hand of the state, especially as it has been applied against Muslim communities
in the post-9/11 period. Quoting Anthony Oberschall, Parker warns that,
. . . democratic states that find themselves confronting terrorist groups are fac-
ing an enemy which, like the giant Antaeus in Greek mythology, draws strength
from its connection to its environment. Any defensive or offensive action taken
by a state is likely to have ramifications for the hospitableness of that environ-
ment which may go beyond those intended or initially perceived: “Episodes of
violent actions and confrontations should be analyzed as strategic interactions.
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A Missing Peace? 927
The strategy of the target is as important as that of the terrorists. The bloody
drama is played before an audience, and its reactions are important for the
outcome.”50
Against this background the importance of building counterterrorism strategies that rob the
terrorists of their narrative and symbolic power is made all the more obvious. Community-
based programs that involve the police and other agencies building a reservoir of social
capital have the potential to go a long way to creating a hostile operating environment for
terrorists and their supporters. Such programs need to be sustained over long periods of
time and directed at audiences that transcend generational, religious, and gender divides.
They also need to reflect greater levels of cultural, historical, and political literacy among
police officers and other government officials, and to this end religious and other cultural
leaders must be critical players. The inclusion of religious and community representatives
in counterterrorism networks establishes trust by sending the message that counterterrorism
policing occurs on behalf of the entire community rather than being an exercise directed
against a particular segment of society. But networks of trust can have further benefits; the
arrests of more than twenty men in Melbourne and Sydney in late 2005 on suspicion of
terrorist-related activities is reported to have resulted from a “tip-off from an Australian
Muslim,” a piece of evidence that triggered the subsequent investigation.51
Terrorism as a Process
Writers such as Gilligan and Elias have noted that almost all people who kill deliberately
hate their own lives as well as those of others.52 Recognizing the nexus between ontological
insecurity and terrorism therefore looms as an important step in the crafting of better
counterterrorism policies. However, while there is no shortage of scholars prepared to pay
homage to such a focus, the need to develop more inclusive policies that reduce feelings
of marginalization are yet to play any significant role in the counterterrorism policies of
most Western states. Instead, as noted earlier, socioeconomic marginalization remains an
issue confined to the periphery of counterterrorism policy; a soft option foisted on to social
workers and community leaders while the bulk of state resources are dedicated to hard
power initiatives that, ironically, seem to be intensifying the very feelings of alienation that
soft power initiatives are designed to reverse. A significant part of the reason for this curious
state of affairs is that the idea of terrorism as a process appears to have been grasped only
tenuously by policymakers. In other words, the nexus between alienation and violence in
the evolution of a terrorist is still under-appreciated.
To paraphrase Horgan, terrorism is a “process comprising discrete phases.”53 These
phases work at the individual, group, and social psychological levels. More importantly, this
mix of psychological, social, and political forces is symbiotic. Neither the psychological, the
social, nor political influences should be considered as discrete in that personal psychologies
also influence the way in which an individual interprets and responds to wider social
conditions.54 In short, all these forces conspire in differing ways on different people. In the
case of terrorists, these dynamics merge to create an existential framework within which
violence looms as a rational and logical choice for addressing perceived injustices against
the self and against one’s fraternal unit. Put more simply, the causes of terrorism are rooted
mainly in what Richardson has called “subjective perceptions, in a lethal cocktail containing
a disaffected individual, an enabling community and a legitimizing ideology” all of which
can be facilitated by the patterns of socioeconomic and political exclusion documented
earlier.55
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928 A. Halafoff and D. Wright-Neville
Figure 1. The alienation process.
This conception of terrorism as a dynamic phenomenon that involves a transitional
psychological state before reaching the point of “acting out” is represented in Figure 1.
Admittedly, capturing the array of emotions and vast repertoire of personal histories and
experiences that have led different individuals to embrace terrorism as a legitimate form
of political action remains extraordinarily difficult. Even so, as argued earlier, there remain
some useful reference points that appear regularly across the variegated life histories of
terrorists motivated at different times by a range of different political and ideological goals.
It is understandable that police and security agencies—as well as many terrorism
scholars—pay particular attention to the extreme right of the diagram, which is the point
at which an attack is immanent. However, there is a need to avoid the temptation to per-
ceive counterterrorism as a largely reactive exercise that involves little more than detecting
and hunting down those individuals who have already crossed the violence threshold. As
discussed earlier, if this perception is permitted to shape policy there is a real danger that
hard-power-based initiatives will prevail over more subtle measures designed and imple-
mented to the left of the alienation threshold with the intention of choking off the number
of individuals who make the transition to violence. In other words, recognizing religious
and cultural diversity, creating greater social spaces for the expression of different forms
of piety, and forging coalitions of community and religious leaders, police and security
agencies and policymakers offer the best chance of identifying the social pathologies that
feed alienation and marginalization and as such a more immediate mechanism for the
implementation of remedial initiatives.
It is therefore not difficult to understand how inclusive counterterrorism strategies
can have beneficial effects in countering alienation and thereby possible radicalization and
violence. However, there is a need to avoid the trap of a “one-size fits all” approach. Diverse
strategies are required at different stages of the alienation process, although at all stages, in
the contemporary world, there is a high likelihood that religious actors can and should play
an important role.
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A Missing Peace? 929
Strategies such as promoting a multicultural and multi-faith society can assist in so-
cial inclusion and stem processes of alienation. Furthermore, responsible statements by
political leaders, public intellectuals, and the press encouraging inclusive, diverse, respect-
ful, and law-abiding communities can contribute to genuine security. In contrast, divisive
rhetoric and Islamophobic and migrantophobic discourse by leaders and journalists can
exacerbate feelings of alienation.56 Free press and free speech, the right to voice concerns
publicly and to air a diverse range of opinions need not be threatened by such state-
ments; the emphasis here is on responsible speech, not on regulation of speech. Indeed,
in order to provide nonviolent outlets for grievances the right to voice concerns and to
nonviolent dissent needs to be encouraged. In this way, multi-faith initiatives, mosque
open days, op-ed pieces, TV shows such as Salam Cafe´, Multifaith Leaders, and Youth
forums all form part of an inclusive counterterrorism strategy. Such initiatives operate most
effectively at the left of the “alienation wedge”; they are obviously not effective strate-
gies once a person has crossed over the “alienation threshold” and emotionally detached
themselves from mainstream society and its institutions. Other initiatives, based on sim-
ilar principles and also calling on the expertise of religious actors, are required in these
cases.
This is a noteworthy point as policymakers and the general public frequently do not
see the benefit of multi-faith engagement or educational activities; they are perceived as
“soft” options. However, placing them in this context they are clearly not “soft” but rather
the most effective methods to address a particular set of issues. When viewed in this way
“hard” options such as promoting a narrow nationalism, citizenship testing, and a return
to discourses that promote the unquestionable supremacy of Judeo-Christian values can
be seen as exclusive and thereby dangerous—aggravating grievances instead of alleviating
them.
Community policing initiatives operate most effectively at the large, middle, and narrow
sections of the “wedge.” Police, through encouraging positive community relations, such
as playing soccer with youth, attending community events, and offering assistance to newly
arriving communities, foster mutual confidence, thereby lessening the risk of alienation.
At the middle end of the “wedge” when states and police protect and uphold the right to
nonviolent expressions of dissent, grievances can be aired safely. Religious communities
have historically played a significant role in critiquing states. If consultative bodies such
as multi-faith and youth councils are established and individuals and communities are
encouraged to air their concerns, and even more so when they genuinely feel they have
been heard and are acted upon, again the risk of alienation decreases.
At the narrow end of the wedge, even after an individual has crossed the alienation
threshold and retreated into small groups of detached and disenfranchised fellow travelers,
religious communities are still well-equipped to play a role by identifying individuals within
their communities who are most at risk, providing guidance, counseling, and if necessary,
alerting the authorities. However, all of this is dependent on the preliminary establishment
of networks of trust.
A shift from narrow national security approaches to multilateral, global security ap-
proaches is clearly necessary if one is to deal with the changing nature of conflict and
violence.57 As Katona et al. have stated, for this to occur successfully there is a need for “a
change in attitudes, shifting from a go-it-alone to a more global cooperative approach.”58
This is true, but such a shift is unlikely to yield the expected returns if new participa-
tory models of counterterrorism practice fail to account for greater religious diversity and
facilitate more input from multi-faith networks and initiatives.
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